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Balkanizing the Balkans
Paul

L.

Atwood

This article seeks to place the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
the context of the larger issue of NATO expansion.

Kosovo war

's

in

argues that the question of
ethnic cleansing in that province of Serbia was largely exploited by the United
States, the creator and most powerful member of the alliance, to break up the former
Yugoslavia, to divide

it,

and

to

make

more manageable for Western

it

the guise of stopping Serb repression,

It

NATO

interests. In

seized an opportunity to build more

bases throughout southeastern Europe, including those being constructed

newest member

states,

NATO's

in

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These actions are

it is in either the former USSR or in
former Warsaw Pact nations. The aim of NATO expansion is seen as an effort to
weaken Russia, especially in the vital oil-rich Caspian Sea basin, which is being
contested for a pipeline to flow either to the west through Turkey and Azerbaijan or
through Russia's Caucasus region. NATO expansion also worries China, which fears
its largely Moslem, far western provinces will seek some measure of unit}' with the
Moslem republics of the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. NATO expansion,

deeply threatening to Russia, positioned as

far from bringing stability

They have made

to

Europe,

inherently destabilizing.

is

a desolation and called

it

peace.

— Tacitus

The speed with which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) moved into
the Balkans in the aftermath of the fall of

This expansion

is

Communism

a far cry from the outlook promoted by

is

stunning in

NATO's

mander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, shortly after he assumed
in ten years, all

American troops stationed

in

first

its

audacity.

military

command

Europe for national defense purposes have

not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed."

establishment of

new

com-

in 1950. "If

1

The

NATO bases throughout the former Yugoslavia and beyond is

seen

by Russia as dangerously threatening, portending a new division of Europe and perhaps a
new Cold War or worse. If one of the central rationales for NATO's expansion is taken at
face value, namely, that the alliance must

move eastward

to contain conflicts

lead to mass outflows of refugees to Western Europe, thereby destabilizing
bers themselves, an endless chain of security

commitments looms

pean nations join. As Senator Richard Lugar once
center without security at the periphery." 2

Thus

said,

as

which might

NATO mem-

more Eastern Euro-

"There can be no security

the stage

is

being

set for

renewed

at the

conflict

with Russia and with the Islamic world that abuts the progressively enlarging security
Paul
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Atwood
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zone. China, too,

is

alarmed

forged by the United States

ment, but

The

growth of the North Atlantic

at the

may

alliance.

The

policies

bring the peace of the sword to the Balkans for the

mo-

what future cost?

at

Union

forces that induced the breakup of the Soviet

Balkan communist regimes. Since then,

instability in the

backed

conflicts for "humanitarian" reasons, the United States has

movements throughout Yugoslavia,

in the late

1980s also led

in the guise of

nationalist-separatist

resulting in the incremental disintegration of the

successful, prosperous, and progressive

— though

to

quashing ethnic

not without important faults

most

— com-

munist/socialist experiments in the region. Beginning with Slovenia in 1991, the United

States and other

NATO parties have fostered or encouraged independence

movements

in

Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, their rhetoric to the contrary

notwithstanding. In
bers

— former

and Poland

March 1999, and

— were admitted
NATO now

not happen.

gary, Bulgaria,

in close proximity to the Balkans, three

parties to the Soviet-inspired
to

Warsaw

NATO despite explicit promises to Russia that this would

and Kosovo. In January 1999,

influential

a

war

at

stake?

members of both

—

from

oil-rich Azerbaijan, a short distance

Union

inconceivable only two decades ago

makers view as being

new mem-

Hungary, the Czech Republic,

has bases in Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Hun-

the Balkans, within the old borders of the Soviet

What seemed

Pact:

is

itself,

now

requested a

NATO base.

What do

U.S. policy-

reality.

parties are agreed

mover

The most
on expansion. Would they venture to wage

the United States is the prime

in this.

in Serbia, in the very backyard of Russia, while ostensibly extending the olive

branch of peace and friendship

to this erstwhile evil

empire?

World War II triumph placed the United States at the top of the global system
constructed by Europeans over the last five centuries, NATO has been the creation and
tool of this nation to achieve its objectives in Europe since 1949. In popular mythology,
the United States entered World War II by default, pushed to the extreme of battle by its
enemies. In reality, newly ascendant internationalists in Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration saw a splendid opportunity to inject this country into the war and thereby defeat

Once

its

the Axis with relative ease, simultaneously exploiting the war-induced weaknesses of
allies,

then putting the United States at the helm of the system and streamlining

serving reasons. 3
history,

was

The

initial rationale for

to contain

1940s that the Red

NATO,

the

Communism. The American

Army was

first

it

its

for self-

formal military alliance in U.S.

public

was

led to believe in the late

poised to invade Western Europe.

We now know that Washington policymakers never believed this to

be the case but

feared the electoral growth, and hence potential legitimation, of communist parties in

Western Europe, especially
in the

wake of World War

in France

II.

and

Italy, in

response to dire economic conditions

A turn toward Communism or Socialism would have

the internationalist objectives of those

American

elites

stifled

who had entered World War II

make Europe and Asia safe for their vision of a rational capitalist world orone which had fractured twice in this century over rivalries among the powers that

precisely to
der,

had created

it.

U.S. policymakers, wielding national power in the postwar period surpass-

ingly greater than any ever achieved in history, believed an

American imperium could

establish conditions favorable to a rational global order.

As

National Security Council paper number 48, the

egy, put matters in 1949,

"The economic

life

first

blueprint for Cold

of the modern world

is

War

strat-

geared toward ex-

pansion [requiring] establishment of conditions favorable to the export of technology and
capital

and

to a liberal trade policy

throughout the world." 4 The Marshall Plan, which

provided significant dollar capital to Western Europeans so they could purchase Ameri-

10

can goods and stimulate trans-Atlantic economic revival, and
the

same walnut"

in President

Harry Truman's phrase. In

NATO were

both were military applica-

fact,

tions of U.S. foreign policy designed to isolate the Soviets

and put them on the defensive

while forcing them to prioritize weapons over consumer goods.

duce the former European powers

NATO's

"two halves of

to virtual subsidiaries of the

It

was

way

also a

to re-

burgeoning America.

Inc.,

was driven by deep economic motives. American arms
manufacturers, their bankers, and numerous other contractors would provide the basic
infrastructure for the military containment of the USSR, with many guaranteed the same
profits as during World War II, mostly at U.S. taxpayer expense. Thus domestic and international economic goals and military planning were inseparable, a salient fact that refor

raison d'etre also

mains just as true

The

should take upon
tion,

to this day.

rationale adopted in

much

wrong

that

was

trumpeted as the

first

and omissions

errors

by Serbs and

that

NATO

no other single power or

including the United Nations, has been willing or able to do, that

ethnic cleansing of Albanians
is

discussion of the war over Kosovo

itself the effort to right a

restore their basic

human

is,

institu-

to stop the

rights.

This action

exercise of the so-called Clinton doctrine, which posits that, past

aside, the

United States and

rescue to save lives and safeguard

human

rights

its

agents will henceforth ride to the

when circumstances allow such

action

without undue cost.

As always, such

prescriptions are couched in highly oblique language, but in this case

NATO allies engaged in air strikes
on behalf of the ethnically cleansed
in U.S. -manufactured planes flown
by U.S. -trained pilots
was Turkey, a nation whose record on human rights is abysmal
and whose cleansing of Armenians early in this century provided the precedent for the
Nazi genocide. Turkey has also driven at least two million Kurds from their homes, killing many more of them than the Serbs had killed Albanians
up to the time the air war
the hypocrisy leaps out. For one thing, one of the

against Serbia

—

—

—

against Serbia began.

While

it

is true that

any military attempt by the United States or

NATO to

stop the Turkish variety of ethnic cleansing would cost a great deal more than
Kosovo operation (something which, of course, is not in the cards), all the United
States needs to do is cut off its arms supplies and economic aid to Ankara.
The United States could also have easily induced Indonesia to stop its barbaric activities in East Timor, where Indonesian troops or their paramilitary agents have caused the
the

death of

at least

one-third of the population since 1975, a genocidal policy

was one, long before

if

the United Nations-mandated plebiscite resulted in an

ing vote for independence. Since the United States gave
sion of East Timor, selling

it

the enabling

weapons

its

ever there

overwhelm-

blessing to Indonesia's inva-

in the first place, this nation shares

— and

there are numerous others, such
war and the human tragedy again
Washington has been relatively silent, making only

responsibility for the tragedy there. In both cases

as the atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone's civil

looming

in the

Horn of Africa

—

symbolic and vacuous noises.

Meanwhile, the mainstream press covers these issues in a manner fundamentally diffrom its coverage of Kosovo. In a word, a double standard obtains for those des-

ferent

potic

governments whose policies are

in

accord with U.S. international goals.

No

matter

however egregious, no serious sanctions will be enforced against the likes of
Ankara or Jakarta. Dictatorial regimes like Serbia's and Cuba's, which do not play the

their crimes,

game according

to the rules laid

down

in

Washington, are subject to withering

if

not

cataclysmic punishments.
All of which raises the question of U.S. goals on both a global and a purely European

11
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level.

According

to the

UN Charter, some regional alliances are allowed, but NATO's

The UN, which is supposed to be the international
been
since its birth by great power Security Counand
peacekeeper,
has
hobbled
monitor
cil disputes and by blatant disregard in Washington. A world order in which the many
actions in

Kosovo

violate that charter.

more or less the same role in global government as
American republic, for example, California versus Rhode
Island, is not the global regime Washington wants.
The role of "globocop" has not fallen by default to the United States; American hegesmall and undeveloped nations have

that of individual states in the

mony

over the international system has been the goal of interventionist elites throughout

this century.
tal,

Their vaunted idea of an open world economy in which commodities, capi-

and technology flow freely across borders appears magnanimous, but

it

has been

readily apparent that control of resources, industrial infrastructure, and military bases

would primarily benefit the United States and the corporations the vision was designed to
protect. As James Forrestal, the first secretary of Defense put it, 'As long as we can
outproduce the world, control the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb, we can
assume risks otherwise unacceptable." 5 In the conception of American internationalists,
the only supranational agencies necessary for global peace and prosperity at that time
were the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, backed up by the U.S. military and its atomic monopoly and its alliance partners.
Again, this strategy was buttressed by reference to the threat posed by international
Communism, an ideology which posited a much different vision of how to organize a
its own hypocrisies and shortcomings notwithstanding
one which stood in
society

—

the

—

way of an American-led world

order. Nationalism,

whether of the revolutionary

vari-

Vietnam or liberal as in Iran until 1953, also obstructed corporate access to the
markets and resources of the greater world. As George Kennan, the author of the containment policy, put it in 1948, "We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of
ety as in

the world's population

relationships

which

.

.

Our real

.

task in the

coming period

is

to devise a pattern of

will permit us to maintain this position of disparity."

6

Union was devastated at the end of World War II and, in the words
of historian Melvyn Leffler, "had no capacity to attack American territory and had no
7
ability to damage the American economy," it was demonized in much the same fashion
as the Nazis had been, despite, or really because of, the fact that the Soviets defeated the

Though

bulk of the

same

the Soviet

German juggernaut. They

then found themselves in possession of much of the
by the Nazis, real estate that Washington had wished
terms. The Cold War began with a refusal by Washington to

territory formerly controlled

liberated of Nazi rule

on

its

permit international control of atomic energy through the

UN, coupled

—

with a claim that

were occupying Eastern Europe illegitimately
virtually every country the
USSR occupied had declared war against the Soviets as allies of Hitler. The Soviet Union
was occupying Eastern Europe for exactly the same reason the United States occupied

the Soviets

Japan.

The Cold War was

intensified

by a campaign

to encircle the

USSR with strategic

bases capable of launching Hiroshima-type bombers. This had the quite predictable effect

of stimulating the Soviets to accelerate their atomic
1949, and to

commit a

bomb

largement and to tighten their totalitarian grip on their

were portrayed

in the

project,

which succeeded

in

vast proportion of their gross domestic product to military en-

West

as further evidence of the

satellites.

communist

These actions,
threat,

in turn,

and so on, lead-

ing to an increasingly racheted and deadly arms race, which, of course, provided the
rationale for

NATO, which

also

came

into existence,

1949.

12

by no means an unrelated event,

in

The mission of

NATO to

contain the Soviets remained credible to the bulk of the U.S.

citizenry as long as the putative threat remained.

of the internal inconsistencies of Stalinism

When

the

USSR

disintegrated, because

and an economy organized

nale also collapsed. There had always been an unstated, and

was

to contain

meet what the

to

NATO's

Soviets perceived as the Western threat, which stressed guns over butter,

more important

ratio-

goal,

which

Washington's ostensible partners from undertaking independent economic

or military policies vis-a-vis the

new world

order. In the

postwar era

meant, accord-

this

Germany nor an indepen-

ing to Leffler, that "neither an integrated Europe, nor a united

dent Japan must be allowed to emerge as a third force." 8 Today these policies are con-

infamous

stantly reaffirmed, as in the

document, reported by The

must continue
trial

to

draft of a

New York Times in

Pentagon Policy Planning Guidance

1993, which argued that the United States

dominate the international system by "discouraging the advanced indus-

nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger global or re-

gional role." 9

(Italics

mine.)

before Congress in 1990 on

sons

As one senior State Department official put it, testifying
NATO's future role, "We need NATO now for the same rea-

NATO was created." The danger, he continued,

was that without American leaderwould revert to type, "renationalize" their armed forces, play the "old
game," and "shift alliances." 10 Economically, a danger exists that Europe

ship the Europeans
geo-political

might achieve something like Napoleon's envisioned Continental system or even Hitler's
planned autarky. Eastern Europe would provide raw materials and cheap labor while

Western Europe would contribute capital and high-tech industries, then close
to the

markets

its

United States and compete with American corporations in the larger world. Such a

Europe, in Walter Russel Meade's conception, might produce
China, under U.S. corporate supervision, and "would buy

its

its

VCRs

in Poland, not

wheat from Ukraine rather

than the Dakotas." 11

Thus, having been rationalized into existence to

NATO was just as much a
containing or

at least

stifle

Communism,

it

turns out that

— way of
— and a very big business indeed,

linchpin of U.S. policy toward Western Europe

channeling

its

Europeanization

a

one whose multifarious contracts, from military equipment to base construction and
maintenance, led directly to the bottom lines of many of the largest U.S. multinational
corporations, and from there to the U.S. Treasury. Multibillion-dollar budgets, many of
them funded by U.S. taxpayers, were at stake. So were the careers of many U.S. and
European officers whose services would presumably no longer be needed, prospects that

augured deep cuts in the U.S. and allied military budgets and in corporate contracts, and
a potential

peace dividend for domestic social programs.

New NATO members

and new bases require arms and money. According

Congressional Budget Office study,
billion

offer

by 2012, assuming the

lower figures. The

between $30 and $52
billion

—

but leaks

NATO enlargement could cost U.S.

stability of

to a

1996

taxpayers $125

Europe's security environment. Other studies

RAND Corporation estimates probable costs of enlargement at

billion.

from

the

The Pentagon

assesses even lower costs

— $27

to

$35

Department of Defense admitted to low-balling figures.

"Everybody realized the main priority was

to

keep costs down

to reassure Congress, as

well as the Russians," said one unidentified source. 12 Whatever the figures, most of the

cash flows directly to U.S.-controlled multinational corporations.

NATO had become its own vested interest,

one
American military-industrial complex.
That billions of dollars in annual contracts, salaries, and other expenditures would simply
vanish or be put to other uses was inconceivable to those whose investments and careers
Institutionalized over a half century,

intimately finked to and codependent with the

13
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NATO was to remain

would require a new and improved misit would become the policeman of Europe and move audaciously to implement phases of the New World Order reaffirmed in
traditional internationalist terms by President George Bush after the Gulf War.
Ostensibly aimed at providing reason and justice to a chaotic globe, this regime is
intended to administer a system of international production and distribution headed by
were

at stake. If

sion.

No

viable,

it

longer needed to thwart the Soviet bear,

the United States for the benefit of the United States and, to the extent necessary to pre-

them from bolting the alliance, its Western European allies. The first order of busiis Europe itself. As Leffler demonstrated in his exhaustive study of the origins of the
Cold War, the aim of Washington in the aftermath of World War II has always been to
reopen Eastern Europe to the U.S. -led system. Indeed, the United States entered the war
in Europe partly to liberate Central and Eastern Europe from Nazi rule, only to see it
occupied by the Soviets in 1945. While the Russians were willing to compromise with
their erstwhile allies, selling out nationalist/communist movements elsewhere, including
the Balkan nation of Greece, Washington, after FDR's death, employed its economic and
military preponderance to demand the East European prize completely on its terms, a
position bound to result in Soviet intransigence. The resulting Cold War prevented the
vent

ness

integration of the east into the U.S. -led global capitalist system, but the collapse of Soviet-style

Communism in

1991 opened opportunities that U.S. policymakers understood

and quickly moved to exploit.
Yugoslavia was one nationalist/communist movement that succeeded in remaining

Under Marshal

outside the Soviet orbit yet resisted Western pressures to conform.

Tito,

warring ethnic groups, particularly the Croatian Ustashe and the Muslim fascists, both of

which had been the tools of the Nazis, and the Serbian Chetniks were suppressed. The
newly resuscitated entity Yugoslavia was set on a course of socialist development independent of the
rule, the Tito

viet

USSR and to a lesser extent of the West.

Noted

for

regime nevertheless enabled Yugoslavia to prosper

model and allowed a progressive movement

that

its

harsh, totalitarian

far in excess

was opposed

of the So-

to tribal hatred

and in

favor of ethnic reconciliation to emerge.

Over the half century between the end of World War II and the collapse of Commuin the early 1990s, Yugoslavia was considered as a model for ethnic harmony,
though this was a romanticization. Extremists kept the ethnic issues alive, at least below
the surface, something Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and the late Franjo Tudjman of
Croatia would exploit for their own benefit in the 1980s. Yet simultaneously there had
grown a decided movement toward ethnic reconciliation in tandem with growing prosperity, the only combination with any prospect of success. Daily life in Yugoslavia's major
cities resembled that in the west of Europe, not the dreary poverty and ideological connism

formity of the Soviet bloc. Belgrade's cafes provided hospitality to a vigorous intelligenartistic establishment, while Sarajevo's population was made up of many families
by ethnic intermarriage. When the movement against Communism gained momentum, one significant faction throughout the former Yugoslavia desired more political
democracy while advocating the retention of those socialist economic institutions that
tsia

and

tied

interests. Yugoslavia, which was
from both the West and Russia, showed potential to remain independent of both
camps, something that was also anathema to both.
The United States and NATO countries have always said that their primary concern

worked, something that did not comport with Western
different

was

to

end ethnic slaughter, return

with Western Europe.

Still,

stability to southeastern

micronationalist independence

14

Europe, and foster

movements among

its

unity

Yugoslavia's ethnic groups were also encouraged to secede from the

Communist

rebellion emerged.

the Serbs quickly

among

all

became

As

moment

the anti-

the most populous and strongest of the ethnic groups,

the focus of ethnic rebellion stirred up by ultranationalists

ethnic minorities.

Once

was recognized, with

the independence of Slovenia

the

prospect of Croatia to follow, the Serbian nationalists began purging areas of greater

Serbia of

other groups, thereby leading directly to war in Croatia and Bosnia and. to a

all

lesser extent at the time,

Kosovo. Atrocities became endemic on

ing ethnic hatreds and weakening the progressives of

As Zoran Djindjic,
more on bombs in one day

ethnic differences.

leader of Serbia's

U.S. spent

than

it

all sides,

further deepen-

who wish

to overcome
Democracy Party put it, "The
ever spent assisting the democracy moveall

groups

ment in Serbia." 13
The Western press focused mainly on Serb crimes, but until the expulsion of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo, the worst case of ethnic cleansing took place in the Krajina area
of what is now Croatia, where at least 300,000 Serbs were forcibly driven from their
homes and many massacred, a fact that received much less attention than atrocities carried out by Serbs. One reason that Serbia wished to displace Kosovar Albanians was to
make room for the uprooted Serbs. Today, of course, Kosovo has been virtually cleansed
of Serbs and Roma. One French peacekeeper told reporters that he had been ordered
14
to stand by while ethnic Albanians sought revenge against Serb families. The U.S. public supported the bombing of Serbia because the Clinton administration said that this
drastic measure was necessary to prevent genocide. While crimes against humanity certainly occurred, evidence is mounting that nothing approaching race murder was happen-

—

ing in Kosovo, although savage acts against ethnic Albanians intensified once Serbia

came under

NATO fire.

In the guise of reining in murderous Serbs,
a prelude to privatizing
the caricature of the

its

Yugo

NATO continues to break up Yugoslavia as

industries (Yugoslavia's auto industry
in the

cess) and ensuring that Western capital gets in

on the

spoils. It is often

the former Yugoslavia and especially Belgrade are situated

commercial waterway of southern Europe, and Kosovo
silver

was much

Western press, a lampoon called forth by

is

and lead mines. In Michael Parenti's words, the aim

better than

its

very suc-

overlooked that

on the Danube, the primary

the site of Europe's richest
is

"to break

it

up

into

little

neo-colonial, right-wing, ethnic, nationalist banana republics that can be totally kicked

around." 15 Just as the rest of the former communist states in East Europe are being "third
worldized," so will the former Yugoslavia be impoverished, with
nulled,

and opened to Western

capitalist

investment

at

its

social

programs an-

bargain-basement rates with ex-

tremely cheap labor available.

The U.S. media have systematically spun
bouillet Accords.

had come

manded
rest

to a

No

myth

that Serbia refused to sign the

mutually agreed-upon settlement, which was not

true.

Ram-

NATO simply

No

independent

state

de-

occupy Kosovo and
would sign such an agreement because

that Serbia allow the organization's troops to

of Serbia as well.

patently

a

such concordance existed. The term "accords" means that both sides
to transit the

would surrender national sovereignty, something

NATO claims to respect.

it

The

Rambouillet wording was designed to guarantee rejection. The Serbs made a counterproposal, offering to allow United Nations forces, with a

police the

human

rights situation in Kosovo.

Serbia subsequently abjured the

component of Russian

troops, to

NATO rejected this outright and when

NATO proposition,

it

was demonized

as a rejectionist

outlaw from the community of nations.

Compare

this

with the U.S. government's laissez-faire stance toward Indonesia's

15
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butcheries in East Timor.

UN forces have gone in to stop violence there as a result of

pressure by ordinary citizens throughout the world

who

bloody tyrant but not

guilty of a double standard. Milosevic is certainly a

from many others with

believe that to do nothing

whom the United States has collaborated,

like

much

be

is to

different

Suharto in Indone-

—

Shah of Iran, and even Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War
sia, Mobuto
with
Milosevic himself during the Dayton conferences, when he was
and to a great extent
charges
promised that no
of crimes against humanity would be leveled against him for
in
Bosnia.
The difference is that they played the game Washington's way
Serb barbarities
crimes
were
overlooked
even financed. If Milosevic had acceded to
and for that their
with
all
along
and
cooperated
the breakup of Yugoslavia on American
NATO demands
terms he would be portrayed in the Western press as a great statesman, and his very real
crimes would be played down as indeed they were after the war in Bosnia.
in Zaire, the

—

NATO
Europe as
former

is
it

not yet the global policeman, but
believes

it

can finesse

— a zone

it

is

certainly the

that is

Soviet clients, fearing the future return

gendarme of as much of

being progressively enlarged.

Many

of their former overlord, have reached out

has leaped into the vacuum left by retreating Russian influence. When
Union began to break up and announced the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
the mirror image of NATO
it did so on the basis of strenuous promises that NATO
would not exploit Russian weaknesses. But exploit them it has by admitting former Warsaw Pact nations and by entering into negotiations for oil exploration in the Caspian Sea
periphery of the former USSR. When we consider that two former national security advisers. Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brezinski, as well as former secretary of State
James Baker, former secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and former Treasury secretary
Lloyd Benson, Democrats and Republicans alike, are consultants for U.S. oil companies
aiming to reap lucrative contracts with the government of Azerbaijan, the real aim of U.S.
foreign policy in this part of the world begins to come into focus. Major investors hope
the next oil bonanza will result from reserves beneath the Caspian Sea as other sources
to

NATO, which

the Soviet

—

—

are expected to diminish.

The U.S. government
through the territories of

therefore wants the vital pipeline carrying this resource to travel
allies,

not through Russia.

One can only imagine

the fallout

if

a

Mexican and Venezusomehow cut off American access and
elan oil strictly to its purposes. Yet despite all claims of friendship toward Russia, most
Republicans and Democrats support measures that they hope will ensure Western control
of this critical asset, much of which was formerly located within the boundaries of the
former Soviet Union. The great race to capitalize on the known oil reserves in Russia's
former Muslim republics in Central Asia also conflicts with China's policies in that restronger Russia could

divert

hoping to align with their Islamic
The Grand Chess Game, the aim of

gion. Turkic tribes there are poised to secede as well,

fellows to the west and south.

As Brezinski noted

in

U.S. policy must be to break up and divide the former Soviet Union. That logic extends
to formerly

communist Yugoslavia

as well, which

it

seems

is

gradually being shaped to

serve as a launching pad for the next foray farther east.

The
tral

British called their competition with Russia for domination in southern

Asia

in the nineteenth century the

two powers. Such

frolics

and cen-

Great Game. The play was hardly confined to these

primed the carnage of the

First

World War and the multiple

holocausts of the second. Hiroshima and Nagasaki ought to have been the proverbial

handwriting on the wall warning us of the endgame of such
the

game

Russia, at

its

folly.

Yet

NATO is playing

gambling that its virtuosity can avoid an apocalyptic showdown with
weakest condition in over half a century, despite much historical evidence

for keeps,
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that

when

threatened, Russia does not back

the Russians have reentered

age in the face of what

West

to humiliate

down and

many

in

Moscow

in

Kosovo. China, too,

Security Council at any one time

is

One

reason that

to rebuild their former im-

perceive as deliberate tactics on the part of the

them. Their claim of bombing

from NATO's record

reacts with force.

Chechnya with such savagery

is likely to

is

strictly military targets is a

page torn

UN

alarmed. At this rate, a plurality of the

NATO

be composed of

members. The notion

that the expansion of NATO will foster stability is delusory. Russia and China, frightened
by a Western military coalition on the march, are already moving to shore up a tenuous
alliance. Even if NATO is momentarily successful in its stratagems, the outlook for a

peaceful twenty-first century

is

inherently corrupted, and

dispiriting fact that the twentieth has

we

been the bloodiest thus

ought not lose sight of the
far.

^*
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